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Abstract
We introduce a novel type of contrarian agent, the balancer, to Galam model of opinion dynamics, in order to account for the
existence of social skepticism over one-sidedness. We find that the inclusion of balancers, along with majoritarian floaters and
single-sided inflexibles, brings about the emergence of a critical point on parametric plane of the dynamical system. Around the
critical point, three distinct phases of opinion dynamics separated by discontinuous changes are found.
1. Introduction
The opinion dynamics is currently one of the most success-
ful branch of sociophysics [1, 2]. It is abound with easy-to-
analyze dynamical models with intriguing insights for social
preferences of people in real-world societies [3–13]. In very
simple settings and with simple assumptions, it seems to cap-
ture the essence of majority-opinion formation in democratic
societies [14, 15]. The opinion dynamics is formulated in a lan-
guage of agent-based numerical simulation, but often the equiv-
alent deterministic dynamical system can be obtained, that can
lead to the analytic solutions.
In the Galam model of opinion dynamics, a system with a
fixed number of binary-valued agents goes through repeated
local-majority updates and reshuffling. Two noteworthy find-
ings of the Galam model are the appearance of dominance of
minority inflexibles over initial majority [16], and the persis-
tence of hung election with near fifty-fifty vote [17, 18]. These
findings have been brought about with the introduction of het-
erogeneous agents to the model: In addition to the floater, the
“normal” agent type who follows the majority rule, there are
two more agent types in the model, inflexible, and contrarian.
Inflexibles are the agents who stick to one opinion whatever the
opinions of other agents are. They can be thought of as repre-
senting vested interest, for example. Inflexibles give rise to the
minority-dominance threshold at its population ratio (3 − 2√2)
to the dynamics [16]. Contrarians are the agents who always
act contrary to the local majority. They can be thought of as
representing skeptical minds concerned with the appearance of
unduly powerful majority. Contrarians are found to create the
hung election after passing 1/6 threshold for its ratio among
total population [17, 18].
One curious aspect of original Galam opinion dynamics is
that the inflexibles and contrarians mixed together either re-
sult in the quick minority dominance of inflexibles, or quick
appearance of hung election [19]. This is to be contrasted to
the subtler, more varied phenomena in real-world dynamics of
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public opinion. Looking into the political histories of various
societies littered with riots and revolutions, we often find that
the skeptical few can act to instigate the opposition to oppose
the inflexibles, delaying their minority dominance. There also
seems to be occasional “contrarian overkill” in which, for ex-
ample, independent-minded few help the minority opposition
to prevail over the majority supported by the solid inflexibles
with vested interest. These occurrences seem to await a proper
modelling in the opinion dynamics.
In this work, we introduce a new agent type, which we call
the ”balancer”, as an alternate modelling of contrarian prefer-
ences. This agent acts as a normal floater except when it meets
inflexibles in its updating group, in which occasion, it invari-
ably acts in opposition to the preference of inflexibles. The
conception of the agent with this behavior resulted from the ba-
sic observation, that people tend to value fairness in the sense
that the society’s decision should somehow respect the overall
majority. In any democratic society, we find a rise of people
with reasoned skepticism and contrarian attitude, that seek to
counter the “unreasonably” powerful few. The contrarians as
appeared in the original Galam model, who oppose any major-
ity opinion, are ill-suited to capture such attitude.
The key finding of this work is the uncovering of the criti-
cal point in the parameter space formed by population rates of
inflexibles and balancers. Around the critical point in the pa-
rameter space, the system displays very rich dynamics such as
the resilience to minority dominance of inflexibles, the persis-
tent hung election and the balancer overkill.
2. Opinion dynamics with new element, the balancer
We consider a system made up of N agents, each of which
takes one of two opinions S or O at discrete time t, each rep-
resenting “support” or “oppose” for a certain issue of common
interest to all agents. We assign a binary value At( j) to j-th
agent at time-step t, which takes the value 1 for for the opinion
S and 0 for O. The opinions of agents are updated determin-
istically with the discrete time-step advance t → t + 1. In the
update process, the agents are divided into groups of uniform
Preprint submitted to Elsevier October 30, 2015
ar
X
iv
:1
50
7.
07
33
9v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  3
0 O
ct 
20
15
size r, and the update is assumed to take place group-locally,
that is, the opinion of an agent in time t + 1 depends only on the
opinion of agents sharing the same group at time t. We limit r
to an odd integer in this work. We also assume that N is an inte-
ger multiple of r, which insures the uniformity of groups. The
central quantity of our interest is the relative size of supporting
and opposing agent populations. We define the supporting ratio
at time-step t by
at =
1
N
∑
j
At( j). (1)
Obviously, at = 1 signifies the total support where all agents
have opinion S , and at = 0, the total opposition with all agents
having opinion O.
The rule of the update is the majority vote with some twists,
that come from the heterogeneous characteristics of agents. We
assume that each agent belongs to one of the following agent
types:
1) floater : This agent updates its opinion always following
the majority rule. It chooses S or O according to the prevailing
opinion of the group it belongs.
2) inflexible : The opinion of this agent is invariant through
all time steps, irrespective to the opinions of others in the group.
There can be both S -type inflexibles and O-type nflexibles, but
in this work, we limit ourselves to the case of the system having
only one of the two types. Since our dynamics is symmetric to
S and O, the choice is arbitrary, and we only consider inflexi-
bles with invariant opinion S , or equivalently, the binary value
1.
3) balancer : This agent updates its opinion just like the
floaters when there is no inflexibles in the group it belongs, but
always updates into the opinion that is opposite to the opinion
of inflexibles. Namely, in the current setting, this agent follows
the majority rule in the absence of inflexibles in the group, and
takes the opinion O (or equivalently, 0) in its presence.
The last agent type is the new element of the current work.
This type represents a spirit of contrarianism, which acts against
opinionated minority wielding excessive influence. This type of
agents are present in all healthy mature democracy. This type
is to be contrasted to the contrarian type introduced in original
Galam model [16] which is characterized by the unconditional
opposition to the local majority:
3’) contrarian : This agent updates into the state which is
counter to the local majority: It takes the value O at time step
t + 1 if there are more agents with S than ones with O at time
step t, and takes S at t + 1 if there are more O than S at t.
We focus on the system consisting of 1) floaters , 2) inflexibles,
and 3) balancers in this work, and briefly look at the conven-
tional Galam system with 1) floaters , 2) inflexibles, and 3’)
contrarians for contrasting and comparison.
After the update, all agents are reshuffled to form new groups
for next update. We start from a configuration in which the
ratio of agents with the opinion S among all agents is a0. A
single update of all agents gives the new supporting ratio a1.
The procedure is repeated until the supporting ratio at eventu-
ally reaches a stable number aF . This procedure can be viewed
either as a model of majority opinion formation in a consen-
sus democracy, or as an idealized description of social decision
based on voting in hierarchical representative democracy [2].
3. Balancer moderation and overkill: Numerical simula-
tions
Consider a mixed system of floaters, S -type inflexibles, and
balancers, whose proportion to the total agent population N is
(1−q−b), q, and b, respectively. We choose the simplest case of
smallest nontrivial group size, r = 3. In Figure 1, we show the
Figure 1: Stable final value of S opinion ratio aF of the system made up of
floaters, inflexibles, and balancers, plotted as a function of inflexible ratio q and
balancer ratio b: three-dimensional view calculated from numerical simulation.
Number of agents are set to N = 240, and the size of the group is set to r =
3. At each run, random initial configuration is evolved for long enough time
T to obtain the s ratio aT , which we identify to aF . The actual value of T
is chosen to be 200, which we have confirmed, by numerically changing T ,
to be large enough. Note the contrast between the peeled-off structure of the
surface in the area 0.3 & q & 0 which represents the coexistence of two stable
final configurations, and the mono-layered surface in the area q & 0.3 which
represents unique final configuration.
result of numerical simulation with N = 240, where the stable
final configuration aF is plotted for varying values of q and b.
For small value of q starting from q = 0, there are two final
configurations aF ≈ q and aF ≈ 1. There is a sudden disap-
pearance of one of these two final configurations at a certain
value of the ratio of inflexibles around q = 0.2 ∼ 0.3 as we in-
crease q. Interestingly, the disappearing branch of aF depends
on the value of b, the ratio of balancers: For smaller proportion
of balancers b, the system with sufficiently large proportion of
inflexibles q evolves to a unique final configuration with near
total support aF ≈ 1. The situation is opposite for larger b, for
which, the system with sufficiently large q evolves to a unique
final configuration with aF ≈ q where most of non-inflexible
agents have the opinion O.
The result could be better visualized with a schematic dia-
gram Figure 2. The whole triangular parameter space (q ≥ 0,
b ≥ 0, q + b ≤ 1) is split into two regions by two lines C1 and
C2, which meet at a branching point (q∗, b∗) located at some-
where around ( 13 ,
1
3 ). In q ≈ 0 side of the lines C1 and C2, two
2
Figure 2: Schematic phase diagram of final configuration aF of the system
made up of floaters, inflexibles, and balancers on the parametric plane of in-
flexible ratio q and balancer ratio b.
final configurations with aF ≈ 1 and aF ≈ q coexist, and a ran-
dom initial configuration converges toward a final stable con-
figuration with one of these two values, signifying the “demo-
cratic” outcome, in which final majority can go either to O or
S depending on the initial configuration. The situation changes
when we cross either the line C1 or C2, by increasing the ratio
of inflexibles q. After the crossing, only a unique stable config-
uration exists, signifying the convergence of the distribution of
the opinions to a single value of aF irrespective to the starting
population a0.
For b = 0, the S -dominance threshold behavior occurs at
q ≈ 0.172, which, of course, is the key finding of the original
Galam model [16]. As we switch-on the balancer population
and increase b, the threshold of S -dominance caused by inflex-
ible minority is shifted upward. This can be interpreted as the
moderating effect of balancers whose presence works for the
restoration of the “democratic” majority outcome.
At the value of b close to b∗, the threshold behavior bridging
two different phases, as we increase q, is softened. At b = b∗,
we eventually observe a smooth merging of two final configu-
rations with aF . 1/2 and aF & 1/2 into a single final config-
uration of “hung election” with aF ≈ 12 .
At the value of b above b∗, we encounter a novel type of fi-
nal configuration. As we increase the inflexible ratio q, there
is a threshold value of q, above which the final configuration
with aF ≈ 1 disappears, and a unique final configuration of
O-dominance emerges as a sole outcome. This rather surpris-
ing result indicates that there can be a dominance of minority
against inflexible-supported majority. This can be viewed as an
“over-kill effect” of balancers who work to negate the “undue
influence” of inflexibles. This effect might give an explana-
tion for occasional election victory, for example, by “progres-
sive” minority opposition against “conservative” majority who
are usually backed by vested-interest minority.
4. Dynamical systems analysis
Although our system is non-deterministic with random shuf-
fling of group division at each update step, Markovian nature of
the dynamics allows us to treat the system, in the limit of infinite
agent number N → ∞, with a deterministic evolution equation
for at, the ratio of S opinion among all agents at time-step t.
k agents update Xk Mk pk(a)
1 000 000→ 000 0 1 (1 − a − b)3
2 100 100→ 000 0 3 (1 − a − b)2(a − q)
3 110 110→ 111 1 3 (1 − a − b)(a − q)2
4 111 111→ 111 1 1 (a − q)3
5 q00 100→ 100 1/3 3 (1 − a − b)2q
6 q10 110→ 111 1 6 (1 − a − b)(a − q)q
7 q11 111→ 111 1 3 (a − q)2q
8 qq0 110→ 111 1 3 (1 − a − b)q2
9 qq1 111→ 111 1 3 (a − q)q2
10 qqq 111→ 111 1 1 q3
11 b00 000→ 000 0 3 (1 − a − b)2b
12 b10 010→ 000 0 6 (1 − a − b)(a − q)b
13 b11 011→ 111 1 3 (a − q)2b
14 bq0 010→ 010 1/3 6 (1 − a − b)qb
15 bq1 011→ 011 2/3 6 (a − q)qb
16 bqq 011→ 011 2/3 3 q2b
17 bb0 000→ 000 0 3 (1 − a − b)b2
18 bb1 001→ 000 0 3 (a − q)b2
19 bbq 001→ 001 1/3 3 qb2
20 bbb 000→ 000 0 1 b3
Table 1: The group agent pattern table for the system with floaters (0/1), in-
flexibes (q) and balancers (b). The first column is an indexing label, the second
column, all possible formation patterns of agents in a group of size r = 3 dis-
regarding the order of the appearance, and the third column, the binary value
of the agents in that group before and after the update. The forth column is
the probability of obtaining an agent with opinion S after the update, the fifth
column, the multiplicity of the pattern coming from the different orderings, and
the sixth column, the probability of the occurrence of the pattern.
For group size three, all possible patterns of agent composi-
tion in a group, which we index by an integer k, is 20. Those
patterns are tabulated in the second column of Table 1, along
with the associated opinion values and their updates, which we
list in the third column. Each of the updated opinion pattern
gives contribution Xk to the S ratio after the updates, which
is listed in the 4th column of the Table. Each pattern k has
multiplicityMk, as tabulated in the 5th column, coming from
the ordering of heterogenous agents, and each pattern has the
probability of appearance pk(a) for the given S ratio a, which
is listed in the last column.
For a system with q inflexibles ratio and b balancer ratio, the
update at −→ at+1 is described by
at+1 =
∑
k
Xk Mk pk(at). (2)
This immediately leads to an explicit form for the evolution
equation of at:
at+1 = −2a3t + (3 + q)a2t − 2q(1 + b)at + q(1 + qb). (3)
We have assumed, in the above derivation, that a balancer
starts every update with the opinion O. This could be justified
for the case of sizeable inflexibles and small number of bal-
ancers. In general, it can also start from S , and we will have
3
to expand the Table 1 in order to account for the balancers with
both 0 and 1 values. The system, then, is to be described by
a set of coupled time-evolution equations with two variables
at( f ) , the S ratio among floaters, and at(b), the S ratio among
balancers. These two quantities give the total ratio of S popu-
lation at = at( f ) + at(b) in combination. It turns out, however,
that our approximate evolution equation (3) produces surpris-
ingly accurate result compared to the numerical simulation for
all values of q and b, which should be a sufficient justification
of our approximation for now.
5. Fixed points of dynamical system
We can readily obtain the fixed points of the evolution equa-
tion (3) by equating at = at+1 = aF . With straightforward cal-
culation we have
a[n]F =
3 + q
6
+
√
α(q, b)
3
cos
[
φ(q, b) − (2n − 1)pi
3
]
(n = 1, 2, 3), (4)
where we define
φ(q, b) = arccos
β(q, b)√
α(q, b)3
, (5)
and
α(q, b) = q2 − 6(1 + 2b)q + 3, (6)
β(q, b) = −q3 + 9(1 − 4b)q2 − 18(1 − 3b)q.
To distinguish the stable final configurations and separators
of at evolution among the solutions a
[n]
F , it is important to iden-
tify regions of parameter space (q, b) in which any of the so-
lutions a[n]F are real. On this respect, two sets of dividing lines
in the parameter space (q, b) play the central roles. They are
specified by the functions q = qC(b) and q = qA(b), which are
respectively defined by
α(qC(b), b)3 − β(qC(b), b)2 = 0, (7)
and
α(qA(b), b) = 0. (8)
Their joint, {q∗, b∗}, specified by
α(q∗, b∗) = β(q∗, b∗) = 0. (9)
is the critical point that characterize the dynamical system. The
actual value of this critical point is obtained as
q∗ =
3
8
(7 − η), b∗ = 2
3
1
(7 − η) −
1
32
(9 + η), (10)
where
η = 2
√
17 cos
[
1
3
(
arccos
39
17
√
17
− pi
)]
. (11)
With η ≈ 6.198, we have the numbers, q∗ ≈ 0.356327 and
b∗ ≈ 0.300747.
The function qC(b) can be split into two functions qC1 (b) for
b > b∗ and qC2 (b) for b < b∗. Suppose we have b below b∗.
When we increase q starting from q = 0, there are two real
solutions a[1]F and a
[3]
F (the former being larger than the latter),
and they merge and disappear when we cross the line qC2 (b).
On the other hand, a[2]F (6 a
[1]
F ) persists till it meets the line
q = qA(b), over which it becomes complex, and smoothly taken
over by now-real valued a[3]F .
Now suppose we have b above b∗. When we start from q = 0
and increase q, there are two real solutions a[2]F and a
[3]
F (the
latter being larger than the former), and they merge and dis-
appear when we cross the line qC1 (b). The other real solution
a[1]F (which is larger than a
[2]
F ) persists until it crosses the line
q = qA(b), over which it becomes complex, and smoothly taken
over by a[3]F which becomes real again beyond that line.
Figure 3: The separating lines specified by qA(b) and qC(b), and the critical
point {q∗, b∗} of fixed point solution aF (q, b) depicted on (q, b) plane. The line
qC(b) has two components qC1 (b) and qC2 (b)
The situation is best understood in Figure 3, in which we de-
pict the parameter space (q, b) with the the point {q∗, d∗} along
with the lines defined by q = qC(b) (which is split into two
pieces marked C1 and C2), and by q = qA(b) (marked A). The
index number [n]. for which corresponding solution a[n]F takes
a real value in each region delimited by the lines. is also indi-
cated. The correspondence between the separating lines and the
critical point in the numerical analysis, Figure 2 and the ones in
the analytical result, Figure 3 should be quite evident.
Figure 4: The structure of the fixed point surface aF (q, b) given by (4) around
the critical point.
The rather complex behavior of the fixed points on the pa-
rameter space (q, b) is linked to the intricate branching structure
around the critical point {q∗, b∗}, which can be appreciated by
inspecting Figure 4, where the surface aF(q, b) near the critical
point is depicted in three-dimensional space (q, b, aF) .
To understand the parametric structure of the fixed point
more closely, we plot, in Figure 5, the stable fixed points and
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Figure 5: The fixed points and the separators of the system with floaters, in-
flexbles, and balancers aF (q, b) given by (4) shown as functions of inflexible
ratio q with a fixed balancer ratio b (left), and as functions of b with a fixed
value of q (right).
the separator for a given b as functions of q (Figure 5 left), and
for a given q as functions of b (Figure 5 right). Also, in Fig-
ure 6, in which we show the three-dimensional plot showing
the fixed points as functions on the parameter plane {q, b}. The
close resemblance between Figure 1 and 6 is a direct evidence
of the validity of our approximation neglecting the presence of
O-values balancer in the process of obtaining (3).
The comparison between our system with balancers and the
system with original Galam contrarian is instructive. From an
analogues table to our Table 1 that should be constructed for
the contrarian agents, we easily obtain the evolution equation
of at, the S ratio at time-step t, for the opinion dynamics with
(1−q−c) floater ratio, q inflexible ratio, and c Galam contrarian
ratio in the form
at+1 = (−2 + 4c)a3t + (3 + q − 6c)a2t − 2qat + (q + c), (12)
where we have assumed that the contrarian has equal probabil-
ity of having the opinion O and S , an approximation that keeps
the symmetry of O and S in the system.
In Figure 7, we plot the stable fixed points and the separa-
tor on the parameter plane {q, c}. It is obvious that the opinion
dynamics of the system with inflexible-contrarian mixture, Fig-
ure 7, is a “direct product” of the model with only inflexibles
and the one with only contrarians. As a result, it is structurally
very simple compared to the system with balancers depicted in
Figure 6. This difference obviously originates from the distinc-
tion between the parametric nonlinearity of (3) with respect to
q and b, and the corresponding linearity of (12).
Figure 6: The stable fixed points and separators aF (q, b) given by (4) for the
system with floaters, inflexbles, and balancers as functions of inflexible ratio q
and balancer ratio b : three-dimensional view.
Figure 7: The stable fixed points and separators aF (q, b) obtained from (12) for
the system with floaters, inflexbles, and contrarians as functions of inflexible
ratio q and contrarian ratio c : three-dimensional view.
6. Discussions
If we regard the Galam model as a idealized description of
consensus democracy in which people come to social decision
after repeated social discourses, it is natural to assume that the
agents in the model recognize the types of other agents in the
discussion group. It is harder to imagine such type-recognition
of others, if the model is regarded as representing hierarchi-
cal majority voting process. However, voters can often detect
the presence of the vested interest and the opinionated extremist
minority even in the large-scale voting process, and the assump-
tion of balancer should not be so unnatural.
Original inspiration of Galam opinion dynamics has come
from the spin-chain dynamics in condensed matter physics. The
novel structure found in our model is the result of the interplay
between inflexible and balancer agents, that makes the system
different from a simple combination of the floater-balancer mix-
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ture and the floater-inflexible mixture. Since the inclusion of a
new type of agent, the balancer, has brought interesting effects
to the opinion dynamics, it is natural to ask whether similar
effects might be found in Ising and other type of spin mod-
els in condensed matter physics. For example, a model with
two types of impurities which have certain peculiar mutual in-
teraction might display an analogues dynamics. A more natu-
ral place to find a counterpart to our balancer dynamics could
be the field of epidemics, where immune cells specifically tar-
get unfamiliar elements in a system while keeping normal cells
unharmed. A mathematical treatment of epidemic spreading
with immune cells modelled by balancers competing against
the cells exposed to disease modelled by inflexible might be of
interest to immunologists.
Sociophysical models are still in the early stage of evolu-
tion, and models of opinion formation on networks, social, ge-
ographical, tele-communicative are now under intensive study.
Inclusion of the balancer type agent in the networked opin-
ion dynamics [7, 20, 21] is of special interest. The current
model obviously is too simplistic to capture the reality, but
this simplicity has allowed us to identify the hidden critical
point acting as a lynchpin holding different parametric regions
of varying dynamics together. With the inclusion of more
realistic elements into the model, such as geographical posi-
tioning of agents with finite mobility, both temporal and geo-
graphical non-uniformity of the system parameters, more than
two choices or several coupled two choices, memory effects of
agents on past choices, it may not be too unrealistic to expect
that a similar feature is also present in more involved models
that aims at precisely describing the dynamics of real-world
public opinions.
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